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suit, the insured defendant brought his insurer into the case by a
third party complaint asking for judgment against the company
for any sum he should be obligated to pay the plaintiff. The de-
fendant recovered judgment against the company for the same
amount as plaintiff's judgment. The Company contended that
defendant had no right to make it a third party defendant be-
cause of a "no action" clause in the policy. Held: The purpose of
Rule 14 (a) is to settle as many conflicting interests as possible
in one proceeding. The "no action" clause is directly opposed to
this rule and courts should not permit litigants to circumvent rules
of court by contractural arrangements. The court also held, how-
ever, that the policy in this case was one of liability and not in-
demnity, and did not contain a true "no action" clause.
McCoy v. District Court:10 At a pre-trial conference in an
automobile damage case, the Court ordered the defendant to fur-
nish plaintiffs with copies of statements made by plaintiffs and
given to defendants after the accident and before suit was filed.
The defendants brought original proceeding for writ of prohibi-
tion. Held: Under Rule 34, plaintiff does not have an unqualified
right to examine a statement made by him and delivered to the
defendant prior to the suit; he must show good cause. Rule 16,
providing for pre-trial conference, does not confer authority on
the trial court to compel production of documents or force the
making of any admissions. The defendant had no adequate remedy
here by writ of error.
In Reserve Life Insurance Company v. District Court," it was
held that where a party is notified to appear for a deposition, he is
not entitled to subpoena nor to per diem allowance nor mileage
under Rule 5 (b) (1).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ELECTIONS, BANKS
AND BANKING
JOHN R. CLAYTON
Eachus v. People:' Defendant was not a bonded butcher and
sold some beef. He was convicted in District Court and appealed on
constitutional grounds. Our Supreme Court upheld the bonded
butcher statute as being within the police power. Our Court further
quoted with approval the following from a United States Supreme
Court case:
We hold that the police power of a state embraces reg-
ulations designed to promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to
promote the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety.
This case is mentioned to show that the legilature is our first line
10246 P. 2d 619, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 23, 1952).
n 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 470 (Aug. 18, 1952).
1238 P. 2d 885, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
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of defense in the protection of personal liberties. The phrase "the
public convenience or the general prosperity" is most inclusive.
City and County of Denver v. Thrailkill:2 Thrailkill sued the
Manager of Safety and Excise who, acting under a Denver ordin-
ance, refused to transfer master licenses authorizing the operation
of a considerable number of motor vehicles as taxicabs. The re-
newal of such master licenses was by ordinance placed within the
sound discretion of the licensing authority. Thrailkill contended
the ordinances against sale, transfer and assignment and such
renewability from year to year were unconstitutional. Our Supreme
Court upheld constitutionality stating that such a license was
nothing more or less than the granting of a privilege to enter upon
a business activity, that it was personal to the grantee, and that
the licensing official could be reached by proper proceedings in the
event of an arbitrary abuse of that discretion. Our Court further
stated that such a master license was a mere personal privilege
and not property in a constitutional sense. Thus no vested right
was acquired when it was originally obtained.
Anderson v. Town of Westminster:3 Plaintiff complained
against the formation of an improvement district contending that
the statutes outlining formation of such a district were unconstitu-
tional as violating due process of law because no Court hearing
was provided for prior to organization of the district. The statute
in question provided for a hearing before the town trustees rather
than a judicial hearing. Our Supreme Court, in upholding the
constitutionality, stated:
We believe a hearing before the governing body of
the town before the passage of any ordinance and, in the
event of a subsequent ordinance creating the district, the
right of judicial review of its validity, preserves due pro-
cess.
Sullivan v. Siegal:4 Section of act repealing prior act limiting
interest on any loan, and other conflicting acts, was invalid and
unconstitutional with respect to loans over $300 as not within title
stating that act relates to loans of $300 or less, and hence prior
act was repealed as respecting loans less than $300, but not as to
loans of over $300. It is commented on primarily to direct atten-
tion of practicing lawyers to the danger of relying upon the present
Colorado Statutes Annotated as law. The practicing attorney can
rely only on the Session Laws.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer:5 The ques-
tion involved was whether the seizure order of the steel mills was
within the constitutional power of the President. Justice Black
delivered the opinion. In holding that the seizure order went be-
yond the constitutional power of the executive, the opinion pointed
out that the President had not relied upon any statutory authori-
'244 P. 2d 1074, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 19, 1952).
1244 P. 2d 371. 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (April 21, 1952).
'245 P. 2d 860. 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 12, 1952).
5343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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zation, but had claimed authority "vested in me by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, and as President of the United
States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces". On the
theory of "inherent executive authority" to avert national disaster,
the Court rules that the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed "limits his functions in the lawmaking process
to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad". The legislative power was clearly reserved
to Congress by the first clause of Article I of the Constitution, it
was declared. (In conjunction with this holding, the speech of
Chancellor Albert C. Jacobs, 10 Judicial Circuit on July 18, 1952,
entitled "The Function of the Courts in Maintaining Constitutional
Government and Individual Freedom" is recommended).
ELECTIONS
Martin et al v. Boyle :6 Under statute providing for organiza-
tion of fire protection districts, and providing that election for
incorporation of territory into districts shall be held and conducted
as nearly as may be in same manner as general elections in state,
that official register lists of elections may be used for determining
voter's qualifications, if a person's name is on latest official regis-
tration list his qualifications as voter at general election are estab-
lished and if he is a taxpayer other than by payment of automobile
taxes he is entitled to vote and if he established all of those quali-
fications and his name is not on official registration list he may
establish his qualifications by affidavit. Laws 1947, ch. 238, sec. 1
et seq., 8; Const. art. 7, sec. 11. The statute, sec. 8, ch. 238,
Session Laws of 1947, provided that "such elections shall be held
and conducted as nearly as may be in the same manner as general
elections in this state". Our Court held that the legislature made
an unequivocal allowance for conditions not controlled by the gen-
eral election laws. Thus, in a special election under this particular
statute, qualifications may be established by affidavit. Compare this
case to City of Montrose v. Niles,7 where our Supreme Court, in
a water and sewage bond election, reiterated the general principle
that the requirements of the law on the qualifications of electors
are mandatory, and must be strictly observed. In the Montrose
case our Supreme Court held that an owner of an automobile, who
had paid the specific ownership tax thereon, a person who owns
property which is assessed in the name of another, and a purchaser
of realty under a contract of sale are not "taxpaying electors" and
are not qualified to vote in a municipal bond election.
BANKS AND BANKING
First National Bank of Denver v. Jones :8 Plaintiff purchased
an automobile from one defendant and financed the purchase thru
the bank. Plaintiff instructed the manager of the installment loan
' 237 P. 2d 110, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 24, 1951).
7238 P. 2d 875, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Oct. 3, 1951).
8 237 P. 2d 1082, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
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department of the bank to investigate the title and to determine
whether the car was good security. The bank's officer asked the
defendant seller if the title were clear. The seller said it was.
Thereupon plaintiff signed the note and chattel mortgage. The car
in fact was mortgaged and plaintiff had to pay off said mortgage.
She sued defendant seller and joined defendant bank. Upon trial
judgment entered against both defendants, the bank appealed.
This case was reversed as to the bank only, primarily on the
grounds of insufficient pleading to show employment of bank to
examine title in plaintiff's behalf. The Court held that the instruc-
tion for such an examination was outside of the employee's duty
in behalf of the bank and, in performing such examination, the
employee became agent of the plaintiff. Any liability resulting from
negligence would be the personal liability of the employee and not
of the bank.
CONTRACTS, AGENCY, SALES AND CORPORATIONS
HARRY A. KING
With exception of the few cases which are hereinafter dis-
cussed, the bulk of the decisions by the Supreme Court in the last
year on the questions of contracts, agencies and partnerships, per-
sonal property, sales and corporations present examples of the
application of familiar rules of law in differing factual situations.
An interesting case presenting and determining questions of
procedure in administration of estates and primarily involving the
reformation of a contract is that of Holter v. Cozad, 238 P. 2d 190.
The question presented for determination by the Court was whether
or not a contract for the purchase and sale of real property entered
into by a decedent during his lifetime, as the seller, and another, as
the purchaser, might be reformed and specifically performed in the
proceeding to administer the estate of the deceased. The petition to
the County Court for this relief was denied. On an appeal to the
District Court the relief prayed for was granted. On a writ of
error to the Supreme Court it was held that because of the in-
definiteness of the description of the property, which was the sub-
ject of the contract, that before a specific performance could be
decreed the contract must first be reformed to set forth the real
agreement of the parties. This the County Court was without
jurisdiction to do in the estate proceeding. On the appeal from the
decision of the County Court, the District Court's jurisdiction was
derivative and limited for the purpose of the appeal to the matters
and things which might have been adjudged and determined by
the County Court in the first instance. It was, therefore, without
jurisdiction to grant the relief awarded in the decree. It was said
that the relief prayed for in the petition filed in the County Court
should have been sought in a separate proceeding filed in the Dis-
trict Court wherein the contract might have been reformed and
specific performance ordered in the one action.
The cases of Oriental Refining Co. v. Hallenbeck, 240 P. 2d
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